1. Philosophical Review 80, 1971, 3-27 (reprinted in J. Glover (ed.), The Philosophy of Mind, Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1976, pp. 142-162). The remarks quoted are on p. 147 of the reprint, to which page references given below also refer.
2. On p. 152 of his essay ‘Names and Identity’ (in S. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975, pp. 139-158) Geach remarks: ‘I have heard there are those who would regard the identity expressed by personal proper names as being conceivably non-transitive’. It is important to note that this is not Parfit’s view: the necessary transitivity of identity is one of his reasons for dispensing with it as ‘what matters in survival’.
3. R. M. White, ‘Wittgenstein on Identity’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 78, 1977, 157–174. In ‘Is Identity a Relation?’, ibid. 80, 1979, 81-100, I have argued that Wittgenstein’s view that identity is not a relation is correct, but not his belief that we need no sign for identity. I have developed these themes more extensively in What Is Identity?, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989.
4. Op, cit., p. 168.
5. Cf. McTaggart's article s. v. 'Personality' in James Hastings (ed.), Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, T. and T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1915. (It was, of course, Peter Geach who drew my attention to this.) My ideas in this and the following section owe much to two papers by Richard Swinburne: 'Personal Identity', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society