1. My discussion of value here is for the purpose of study in interpersonal comparisons of utility and distributive justice and, hence, is from a point of view of social choice and decision. Then my view seems to be also that of most decision scientists, as exemplified by the following statement by Peter C. Fishburn: “Every decision situation is unique. Value and worth have meaning only in connection with a human agent within a purpose, and is relative to this agent within the context of a decision situation.”* Here the term “relative” is referred to the decision situation of an agent and, therefore, is equivalent to my “subjective.” * Peter C. Fishburn, Decision and Value Theory (New York: John Wiley and Sones, 1964), pp. 39-40.
2. J. L. Hanson, A Dictionary of Economics and Commerce (London: MacDonald and Evens, 1969), p. 127.
3. C. L. Sheng, “A General Utility Function for Decision Making,” Mathematical Modelling, Vol. 5, No. 4 (1984), pp. 265–274.
4. Ralph L. Keeney and Howard Raiffa, Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value Tradeoffs (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1976), p. 150.
5. John C. Harsanyi has a similar opinion as mine. He distinguishes between a person’s manifest preferences and true preferences. See John C. Harsanyi, “Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour,” Social Research, Vol. 44, No. 4 (Winter 1977), pp. 39-62.