1. I use the terms ‘moral intuitions’ and ‘intuitive concerns’ for a person’s well-considered, but pre-theoretical moral judgements about particular situations, actions or policies. Moral intuitions have a strong motivational component, but are certainly not immune to critique. Moral reflection often involves assessment and adjustment of one’s moral intuitions in the light of more general considerations (principles, theories) and vice versa, aiming for a well-considered, coherent set of beliefs (reflective equilibrium). Cf. Rawls, 1971: 47–48; Heeger, 1992: 95–96; Vedder, 1998.
2. Why a moral problem? It is highly problematic to argue that ‘medicalization problems’ are moral problems, before explicating these problems themselves. There are no uncontroversial criteria which enable one to distinguish moral from non-moral problems. Cf. Louden, 1992: 168. At this moment I stipulate that these problems are moral problems, because they are phenomena requiring further moral reflection. At the end of this chapter I hope to have made clear that the problems indeed are moral problems.
3. Ten Have and Welie, 1996: 97–108. R Conrad, 1992: 213.
4. Ten Have and De Wert, 1987: 71–87
5. Zola, 1972: 487. De Swaan, 1989: 1168.