Long-run efficiency and property rights sharing for pollution control-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Long-run efficiency and property rights sharing for pollution control

Published:1980 Issue:1 Volume:35 Page:59-74
ISSN:0048-5829
Container-title:Public Choice
language:en
Short-container-title:Public Choice

Author:

Mumy Gene E.

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Economics and Econometrics,Sociology and Political Science

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/BF00154749.pdf

Reference13 articles.

1. Baumol, W.J., and Oates, W.E. The Theory of Environmental Policy. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1975.

2. Bramhall, D.E., and Mills, E.S. ?A Note on the Asymmetry Between Fees and Payments,? Water Resources Res. 2 (Third Quarter 1966), pp. 615?616.

3. Breton, A. The Economic Theory of Representative Government. Chicago, 1974.

4. Buchanan, Cost and Choice. Chicago, 1969.

5. Buchanan, J.M., and Tullock, G. ?Polluters? Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes,? American Economic Review 65 (March 1975), pp. 139?147.

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