Mechanism Design for Two-Opposite-Facility Location Games with Penalties on Distance-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Mechanism Design for Two-Opposite-Facility Location Games with Penalties on Distance

Published:2018 Issue: Volume: Page:256-260
ISSN:0302-9743
Container-title:Algorithmic Game Theory
language:
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Author:

Chen Xujin,Hu Xiaodong,Jia Xiaohua,Li Minming,Tang Zhongzheng,Wang Chenhao

Publisher

Springer International Publishing

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-319-99660-8_24

Reference4 articles.

1. Feigenbaum, I., Sethuraman, J.: Strategyproof mechanisms for one-dimensional hybrid and obnoxious facility location models. In: AAAI Workshop: Incentive and Trust in E-Communities (2015)

2. Moulin, H.: On strategy-proofness and single peakedness. Public Choice 35(4), 437–455 (1980)

3. Procaccia, A.D., Tennenholtz, M.: Approximate mechanism design without money. In: ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 177–186 (2009)

4. Zou, S., Li, M.: Facility location games with dual preference. In: International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, pp. 615–623 (2015)

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