1. I would like to thank Marko Ahteensuu, Joseph Almog, Tommaso Bertolotti, Olli Koistinen, Eerik Lagerspetz, Elena Lisanyuk, Lorenzo Magnani, Thomas Magnell, Rosa Rantanen, Arto Repo, Juho Ritola, Andrei Rodin, and Helena Siipi for their helpful comments. Presumption and action, see e.g. Katzner, L.I.: Presumptivist and Nonpresumptivist Principles of Formal Justice. Ethics 81, 253–258 (1971); Ullmann-Margalit, E.: On Presumption. The Journal of Philosophy 80, 143–163 (1983); Räikkä, J.: Burden of Proof Rules in Social Criticism. Argumentation 11, 463–477 (1997); Hahn, U., Oaksford, M.: The Burden of Proof and Its Role in Argumentation. Argumentation 21, 39–61 (2007).
2. The presumption of equality is discussed e.g. by Benn, S.I., Peters, R.S.: The Principles of Political Thought, pp. 127–128. The Free Press, New York (1959); Frankena, W.K.: The Concept of Social Justice. In: Brandt, R. (ed.) Social Justice, pp. 1–29. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs (1962), esp. 10–13; Feinberg, J.: Social Justice, pp. 101–102. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs (1973); Rabinowicz, W.: The Presumption of Equality. A paper presented at the Symposium on Priority, Equality, and Utility. University of Turku (October 14, 2011).
3. Some authors seem to operate without this distinction. Hahn and Oaksford argue that burden of proof may impose a “duty to generate” a certain “degree of confidence in the adjudicator’s mind”. The Burden of Proof and Its Role in Argumentation, 43.
4. See e.g. Raz, J.: Reasons: Practical and Adaptive. Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper 12, 1–23 (2007), esp. 2. For a discussion, see Tadros, V.: Rethinking the Presumption of Innocence. Criminal Law and Philosophy 1, 193–213 (2007).
5. Dare, T., Kingsbury, J.: Putting the Burden of Proof in Its Place: When Are Differential Allocations Legitimate? The Southern Journal of Philosophy 46, 503–518 (2008), esp. 507.