Verifying Constant-Time Implementations by Abstract Interpretation-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Verifying Constant-Time Implementations by Abstract Interpretation

Published:2017 Issue: Volume: Page:260-277
ISSN:0302-9743
Container-title:Computer Security – ESORICS 2017
language:
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Author:

Blazy Sandrine^ORCID,Pichardie David,Trieu Alix

Publisher

Springer International Publishing

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-319-66402-6_16

Reference37 articles.

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2. Almeida, J.B., et al.: Verifying constant-time implementations. In: 25th USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 16 (2016)

3. Andrysco, M., et al.: On subnormal floating point and abnormal timing. In: Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (2015)

4. Barnett, M., et al.: Boogie: a modular reusable verifier for object-oriented programs. In: Proceedings of FMCO 2005 (2005)

5. Barthe, G., et al.: System-level non-interference for constant-time cryptography. In: Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) (2014)

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