Necessary and sufficient conditions forl-stability of games in constitutional form-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Necessary and sufficient conditions forl-stability of games in constitutional form

Published:1989-03 Issue:1 Volume:18 Page:91-110
ISSN:0020-7276
Container-title:International Journal of Game Theory
language:en
Short-container-title:Int J Game Theory

Author:

Andjiga N. G.,Moulen J.

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty,Economics and Econometrics,Social Sciences (miscellaneous),Mathematics (miscellaneous),Statistics and Probability

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/BF01248497.pdf

Reference11 articles.

1. Andjiga NG (1987) Coeurs d'un jeu sous forme constitutionnelle. Thèse de doctorat de 3è cycle. Université de Yaoundé

2. Arrow KJ (1963) Social choice and individual values, 2nd ed. Wiley, New York

3. Keiding H(1985) Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of effectivity functions. Int Jour of Game theory 14(2):93?101

4. Moulen J (1977a) Fonction de dominance d'un jeu sous forme constitutionnelle. CR Acad Sc Paris t-284:907?910

5. Moulen J (1977b) Coeur d'un jeu sous forme constitutionnelle. CR Acad Sc Paris t-284:1229?1231

Cited by 6 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

1. Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?;Journal of Economic Theory;2020-01

2. Do Coalitions Matter in Designing Institutions?;SSRN Electronic Journal;2018

3. Conservative vs optimistic rationality in games: A revisitation;Economics Letters;2017-07

4. Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction;Games and Economic Behavior;2011-05

5. On Coalitional Game Contexts and Their Concept Lattices;SSRN Electronic Journal;2002