A Characterization of 2-Player Mechanisms for Scheduling-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

A Characterization of 2-Player Mechanisms for Scheduling

Published: Issue: Volume: Page:297-307
ISSN:0302-9743
Container-title:Algorithms - ESA 2008
language:
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Author:

Christodoulou George,Koutsoupias Elias,Vidali Angelina

Publisher

Springer Berlin Heidelberg

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-540-87744-8_25.pdf

Reference27 articles.

1. Andelman, N., Azar, Y., Sorani, M.: Truthful approximation mechanisms for scheduling selfish related machines. In: STACS, pp. 69–82 (2005)

2. Archer, A.: Mechanisms for Discrete Optimization with Rational Agents. PhD thesis, Cornell University (January 2004)

3. Archer, A., Papadimitriou, C.H., Talwar, K., Tardos, É.: An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents. In: SODA, pp. 205–214 (2003)

4. Archer, A., Tardos, É.: Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents. In: FOCS, pp. 482–491 (2001)

5. Archer, A., Tardos, É.: Frugal path mechanisms. In: SODA (2002)

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