Automated Mechanism Design: A New Application Area for Search Algorithms-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Automated Mechanism Design: A New Application Area for Search Algorithms

Published:2003 Issue: Volume: Page:19-36
ISSN:0302-9743
Container-title:Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming – CP 2003
language:
Short-container-title:

Author:

Sandholm Tuomas

Publisher

Springer Berlin Heidelberg

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-540-45193-8_2

Reference55 articles.

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4. Avery, C., Hendershott, T.: Bundling and optimal auctions of multiple products. Review of Economic Studies 67, 483–497 (2000)

5. Bartholdi III, J.J., Orlin, J.B.: Single transferable vote resists strategic voting. Social Choice and Welfare 8(4), 341–354 (1991)

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