1. See, e.g., K. M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, U. Chicago. L. Rev. 59 (1992), 195; Paul E. Salamanca, Civil Rights: Looking Back — Looking Forward: The Liberal Policy and Illiberalism in Religious Traditions, Barry L. Rev. 4 (2003), 97; M. Mutua, Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique, 2002 (The establishments of Christianity and Islam in Africa perpetrated major human rights violations).
2. This is the underlying premise of the view that the Establishment Clause of the US Constitution does not prohibit government aid of religion if the aid is “neutral” and there is “genuine and independent private choice.” See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (Upholding the constitutionality of school vouchers program that included religious schools); R. L. Cord, Separation of Church and State: Historical Fact and Current Fiction, 1982; M.M. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, U. Chi. L. Rev. 59 (1992), 115.
3. McConnell offers a related classification between three possible purposes of the Religious Clauses: (1) the “separationist ideal,” under which “religion is deemed to be irrelevant to determination of the citizens’ civic obligations”; (2) the “ideal of neutrality,” under which “religion is understood as one form of voluntary association... neither feared nor favored”; and (3) the “ideal of religious liberty,” according to which “the Establishment Clause protects against government action that may coerce, induce or... even endorse religion.” See M. W. McConnell, Neutrality, Separation and Accommodation: Tensions in American First Amendment Doctrine, in: R. J. Ahdar (ed.), Law and Religion, 2000, 63 (64). Clearly, the Establishment Clause may serve multiple functions. See, e.g., S. H. Shiffrin, Liberalism and the Establishment Clause, Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 78 (2003), 717.
4. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 27 (1947) (Jackson J., dissenting). See also, e.g., G. Ivers, Redefining The First Freedom — The Supreme Court and The Consolidation of State Power, 1993, 133 (“[The Establishment Clause was created] to ensure robust protection for religious freedom... The separation of church and state is a necessary predicate for religious free exercise.”); L. W. Levy, The Establishment Clause — Religion and the First Amendment, 1986, 174 (“The same authority that can incidentally benefit religion by the exercise of legitimate powers may also injure religion. A power to help is also a power to hinder or harm... Those who clamor for additional government support of religion should beware of the risks to religion from government entanglements.”); J. E. Wood, Jr., Government Intervention in Religious Affairs: An Introduction, in: J. E. Wood, Jr./D. Davis (eds.), The Role Of Government in Monitoring and Regulating Religion in Public Life, 1993, 1 (5) (“while the concern of the Founding Fathers was primarily over the possible domination of the state by the church, today there is increasing concern... over the domination of the church by the state.”); I. C. Lupu/R. W. Tuttle, Historic Preservation Grants to Houses of Worship: A Case Study in the Survival of Separationism, B.C. L. Rev. 43 (2002), 1139 (Invoking a principle of Religion Clause symmetry — what the government may regulate it may also subsidize and vice-versa).
5. Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Acts explicitly allows religious organizations to discriminate on religious grounds in employment (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(e)(1)(§702(e)(2))). See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (“Section 702 served a permissible secular purpose by minimizing government interference with a religion’s decision-making process.”).