Vote Buying as Rent Seeking: Land Sales in China’s Village Elections

Author:

Ma XiaoORCID,Whiting Susan H.,Zhang Tonglong,Zhao Tan

Abstract

AbstractWhat explains why vote buying occurs in some elections but not others? The phenomenon of vote buying is under-studied in authoritarian, single-party-dominant regimes, especially in non-partisan elections in which competition is candidate-centered rather than party centered. Village elections in China provide a valuable window on the dynamics of vote buying in these conditions. Employing both an in-depth case study and an original, panel survey to provide new, systematic measures of rents and vote buying, we develop and test the following hypothesis: the availability of non-competitive rents accessible by winning candidates explains the variation in the incidence of vote buying in local elections. Our causal identification strategy exploits the timing of land takings and the exogenous nature of formal land takings authorized in state land-use plans at higher administrative levels to test the vote-buying-as-rent-seeking hypothesis. We find that the lure of rents, mainly from government takings of village land, is a key driver of vote buying by non-partisan candidates for the office of village leader. The evidence suggests that vote buying provides information to the authoritarian state about which local elites it should recruit into the rent-sharing coalition.

Funder

Young Scientists Fund

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Political Science and International Relations,Sociology and Political Science,Development

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2. The Fiscal Logic of Responsiveness: Public Finance, Elections, and Public Goods Provision in Rural China;Studies in Comparative International Development;2023-02-08

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