When to join a coalition, and with how many others, depends on what you expect the outcome to be-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

When to join a coalition, and with how many others, depends on what you expect the outcome to be

Published:1974-03 Issue:1 Volume:17 Page:11-25
ISSN:0048-5829
Container-title:Public Choice
language:en
Short-container-title:Public Choice

Author:

Brams Steven J.,Heilman John G.

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Economics and Econometrics,Sociology and Political Science

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/BF01718994.pdf

Reference18 articles.

1. Adrian, Charles H., and Press, Charles. “Decision Costs in Coalition Formation,”American Political Science Review 62 (June 1968): 556–563.

2. Brams, Steven J. “The APSA and Minority Representation,”PS (Summer 1970a): 321–335.

3. ——. “A Cost/Benefit Analysis of Coalition Formation in Voting Bodies,” inProbability Models of Collective Decision-Making, ed. by Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg. Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1972.

4. ——. “Positive Coalition Theory: The Relationship between Postulated Goals and Derived Behavior,” inPolitical Science Annual IV: an International Review, ed by Cornelius P. Cotteret al. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1973: 3–40.

5. --. “Three Equilibrium Models of Coalition Formation in Voting Bodies.” Paper presented at the Conference on Theories of Collective Behavior, University of Pennsylvania, December 10–11, 1970b.

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