Nash versus coarse correlation

Author:

Georgalos Konstantinos,Ray Indrajit,SenGupta Sonali

Abstract

AbstractWe run a laboratory experiment to test the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium (Moulin and Vial in Int J Game Theory 7:201–221, 1978), with a two-person game with unique pure Nash equilibrium which is also the solution of iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies. The subjects are asked to commit to a device that randomly picks one of three symmetric outcomes (including the Nash point) with higher ex-ante expected payoff than the Nash equilibrium payoff. We find that the subjects do not accept this lottery (which is a coarse correlated equilibrium); instead, they choose to play the game and coordinate on the Nash equilibrium. However, given an individual choice between a lottery with equal probabilities of the same outcomes and the sure payoff as in the Nash point, the lottery is chosen by the subjects. This result is robust against a few variations. We explain our result as selecting risk-dominance over payoff dominance in equilibrium.

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)

Reference74 articles.

1. Anbarci, N., Feltovich, N., & Gurdal, M. Y. (2018). Payoff inequity reduces the effectiveness of correlated-equilibrium recommendations. European Economic Review, 108, 172–190.

2. Anctil, R. M., Dickhaut, J., Kanodia, C., & Shapiro, B. (2004). Information transparency and coordination failure: Theory and experiment. Journal of Accounting Research, 42, 159–195.

3. Andreoni, J., Brown, P. M., & Vesterlund, L. (2002). What makes an allocation fair? Some experimental evidence. Games and Economic Behavior, 40, 1–24.

4. Arifovic, J., Evans, G., & Kostyshyma, O. (2013). Are sunspots learnable? An experimental investigation in a simple general equilibrium model. Staff Working Papers 13–14, Bank of Canada.

5. Arifovic, J., & Jiang, J. H. (2014). Do sunspots matter? Evidence from an experimental study of bank runs. Staff Working Papers 14–12, Bank of Canada.

Cited by 6 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献 订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

1. Quasi-Conventions;Synthese;2023-03-03

2. On the empirical relevance of correlated equilibrium;Journal of Economic Theory;2022-10

3. Equilibrium design in an n-player quadratic game;Review of Economic Design;2022-04-04

4. Correlated Equilibria and Forecasts based on Naïve Play in Hawk-Dove Games;SSRN Electronic Journal;2022

5. Correlated equilibrium under costly disobedience;Mathematical Social Sciences;2021-11

同舟云学术

1.学者识别学者识别

2.学术分析学术分析

3.人才评估人才评估

"同舟云学术"是以全球学者为主线,采集、加工和组织学术论文而形成的新型学术文献查询和分析系统,可以对全球学者进行文献检索和人才价值评估。用户可以通过关注某些学科领域的顶尖人物而持续追踪该领域的学科进展和研究前沿。经过近期的数据扩容,当前同舟云学术共收录了国内外主流学术期刊6万余种,收集的期刊论文及会议论文总量共计约1.5亿篇,并以每天添加12000余篇中外论文的速度递增。我们也可以为用户提供个性化、定制化的学者数据。欢迎来电咨询!咨询电话:010-8811{复制后删除}0370

www.globalauthorid.com

TOP

Copyright © 2019-2024 北京同舟云网络信息技术有限公司
京公网安备11010802033243号  京ICP备18003416号-3