Author:
Konrad Kai A.,Morath Florian
Abstract
AbstractWe study learning and selection and their implications for possible effort escalation in a simple game of dynamic property rights conflict: a multi-stage contest with random resolve. Accounting for the empirically well-documented heterogeneity of behavioral motives of players in such games turns the interaction into a dynamic game of incomplete information. In contrast to the standard benchmark with complete information, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium features social projection and type-dependent escalation of efforts caused by learning. A corresponding experimental setup provides evidence for type heterogeneity, for belief formation and updating, for self-selection and for escalation of efforts in later stages.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
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