Abstract
AbstractIn the late 19th century, Swedish mathematician Edvard Phragmén proposed a load-balancing approach for selecting committees based on approval ballots. We consider three committee voting rules resulting from this approach: two optimization variants—one minimizing the maximum load and one minimizing the variance of loads—and a sequential variant. We study Phragmén ’s methods from an axiomatic point of view, focusing on properties capturing proportional representation. We show that the sequential variant satisfiesproportional justified representation, which is a rare property for committee monotonic methods. Moreover, we show that the optimization variants satisfyperfect representation. We also analyze the computational complexity of Phragmén ’s methods and provide mixed-integer programming based algorithms for computing them.
Funder
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
Austrian Science Fund
Knut och Alice Wallenbergs Stiftelse
Isaac Newton Institute for Mathematical Sciences
H2020 European Research Council
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
General Mathematics,Software
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