Abstract
AbstractSome studies in implicit learning investigate the mechanisms by which implicitly acquired knowledge (e.g., learning a sequence of responses) becomes consciously aware. It has been suggested that unexpected changes in the own behavior can trigger search processes, of which the outcome then becomes aware. A consistent empirical finding is that participants who develop explicit knowledge show a sudden decrease in reaction times, when responding to sequential events. This so called RT-drop might indicate the point of time when explicit knowledge occurs. We investigated whether an RT-drop is a precursor for the development of explicit knowledge or the consequence of explicit knowledge. To answer this question, we manipulated in a serial reaction time task the timing of long and short stimulus-onset asynchronies (SOA). For some participants, the different SOAs were presented in blocks of either long or short SOAs, while for others, the SOAs changed randomly. We expected the participants who were given a blocked presentation to express an RT-drop because of the predictable timing. In contrast, randomly changing SOAs should hamper the expression of an RT-drop. We found that more participants in the blocked-SOA condition than in the random-SOA condition showed an RT-drop. Furthermore, the amount of explicit knowledge did not differ between the two conditions. The findings suggest that the RT-drop does not seem to be a presupposition to develop explicit knowledge. Rather, it seems that the RT-drop indicates a behavioral strategy shift as a consequence of explicit knowledge.
Funder
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
Universität zu Köln
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous),Developmental and Educational Psychology,Experimental and Cognitive Psychology,General Medicine
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