1. That I do not use “good” to mean “intrinsically good” and why I do not will become clear in the sequel. But “good” is a one-term predicate, not a relation.
2. This point has been made by Gustav Bergmann. See his “Undefined Descriptive Predicates,”Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 8 (1947), especially pp. 81–82. Also “Logical Positivism” inA History of Philosophical Systems, V. Ferm, ed. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1950).
3. The Philosophy of G. E. Moore (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1942), p. 589.
4. Compare the gestalt psychologists' insistence that such properties as well as meaning and value are “in the world.” But their psychological insight is frequently vitiated by an accompanying idealistic metaphysic about meaning.
5. W. K. Frankena, “The Naturalistic Fallacy,”Mind, vol. 48 (1939).