Abstract
AbstractThe thesis that animals feel a morally relevant kind of pain is an incredibly popular one, but explaining the evidence for this belief is surprisingly challenging. Michael Murray has defended neo-Cartesianism, the view that animals may lack the ability to feel pain in a morally relevant sense. In this paper, I present the reasons for doubting that animals feel morally relevant pain. I then respond to critics of Murray’s position, arguing that the evidence proposed more recently is still largely unpersuasive. I end by considering the implications for moral discourse and praxis.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Reference25 articles.
1. Campbell, J., & Meyer, R. (2006). Mechanisms of neuropathic pain. Neuron, 52(1), 77–92.
2. Derbyshire, S. W. G., & Bockmann, J. C. (2020). Reconsidering fetal pain. Journal of Medical Ethics, 46, 3–6.
3. Engel Jr., M. (2009). Nature red in tooth and claw: Theism and the problem of animal suffering. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2009(02), 33.
4. Feinstein, J. S., Khalsa, S. S., Salomons, T. V., Prkachin, K. M., Frey-Law, L. A., Lee, J. E., Tranel, D., & Rudrauf, D. (2016). Preserved emotional awareness of pain in a patient with extensive bilateral damage to the insula, anterior cingulate, and amygdala. Brain Structure & Function, 221, 1499–1511.
5. Francescotti, R. (2013). The problem of animal pain and suffering. In D. Howard-Snyder & D. P. McBrayer (Eds.), The Blackwell companion to the problem of evil. Oxford: John Wiley & Sons.
Cited by
5 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献