Abstract
AbstractIn this paper I critically engage with Pauline Kleingeld’s ‘volitional self-contradiction’ interpretation of Kant’s formula of universal law. I make three remarks: first, I seek to clarify what it means for a contradiction to be volitional as opposed to logical; second, I suggest that her interpretation might need to be closer to Korsgaard’s ‘practical contradiction’ interpretation than she thinks; and third, I suggest that more work needs to be done to explain how a volitional self-contradiction generates both a ‘contradiction in conception’ and a ‘contradiction in will.’
Funder
Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences
Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung
Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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