The Principle of Alternate Possibilities as Sufficient but not Necessary for Moral Responsibility: A way to Avoid the Frankfurt Counter-Example-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

The Principle of Alternate Possibilities as Sufficient but not Necessary for Moral Responsibility: A way to Avoid the Frankfurt Counter-Example

Published:2016-02-27 Issue:3 Volume:44 Page:961-969
ISSN:0048-3893
Container-title:Philosophia
language:en
Short-container-title:Philosophia

Author:

Young Garry

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Philosophy

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11406-016-9690-2.pdf

Reference20 articles.

1. Blumenfeld, D. (1971). The principle of alternate possibilities. Journal of Philosophy, 68(11), 339–345.

2. Elzein, N. (2013). Pereboom’s Frankfurt case and derivative culpability. Philosophical Studies, 166, 553–573.

3. Fischer, J. M. (1994). The metaphysics of free will. Oxford: Blackwell.

4. Fischer, J. M. (2002). Frankfurt-style examples, responsibility and semi-compatibilism. In R. Kane (Ed.), Free will (pp. 95–110). Oxford: Blackwell.

5. Fischer, J. M., & Ravizza, M. (1991). Responsibility and inevitability. Ethics, 101(2), 258–278.

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