Abstract
AbstractThe overall aim of this paper is to explore the role of knowledge and truth in the practical deliberation of candidate virtuous agents. To this end, the paper considers three criticisms of Julia Driver’s recent defence of the prospect of ‘virtues of ignorance’ or virtues for which knowledge may be considered unnecessary or untoward. While the present essay agrees with the general drift of Driver’s critics that we should reject such virtues construed as traits that deliberately embrace ignorance, it is more sympathetic to the suggestion that virtue and virtues may need to accommodate some absence or deficit of knowledge and proceeds to further scrutiny of this possibility. More radically, however, the paper concludes by arguing that while knowledge is an overall desideratum of virtue and virtuous conduct, there are circumstances in which even complete knowledge may be insufficient to identify or determine the precise course and direction of such conduct.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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