Abstract
AbstractUsing computer simulations based on empirical data, we show that seven voting rules that we call the IRV family (Instant-runoff voting, exhaustive ballot, Condorcet-IRV, Benham, Smith-IRV, Tideman and Woodall) are less sensitive to coalitional manipulation than a large selection of prominent voting rules. While the relative performances of these seven rules still deserve further investigation, we show that the differences are at most marginal.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Law,Economics and Econometrics,Philosophy,Sociology and Political Science
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