The role of ethical reflection and dialogue in conceptualising animal welfare

Abstract

AbstractThis paper argues that ethical reflection and dialogue can assist in understanding what animal welfare is. Questions about animal welfare’s nature are thorny and contested. Responding to an essay by Donald Bruckner, the paper acknowledges that animal welfare is a type of normative value (namely prudential value) distinct from ethical value and that the methodology for determining prudential value is not simply reducible to ethical thought. However, it contends that connections between ethics and understanding wellbeing are closer than we might expect. The paper argues that: the broad conception of welfare we seek must answer to ethics; ethical responses can sometimes expose existing hidden or denied beliefs about prudential value/wellbeing; some judgements about wellbeing’s nature are internal to and thereby newly revealed in ethical judgements; understanding prudential value often requires sensitivity and responsiveness somewhat like that required in good ethical thinking. In these ways, and perhaps contrary to our assumptions, ethics (and philosophy) can help us conceptualise animal welfare.