Abstract
AbstractA semantic solution to the liar paradox (“This statement is not true”) is presented in this article. Since the liar paradox seems to evince a contradiction, the principle of non-contradiction is preliminarily discussed, in order to determine whether dismissing this principle may be reason enough to stop considering the liar paradox a problem. No conclusive outcome with respect to the value of this principle is aspired to here, so that the inquiry is not concluded at this point and the option to explore an alternative, semantic, solution remains open. This proposed solution is focused on what the liar paradox expresses and what it fails to express.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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