Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous),Business, Management and Accounting (miscellaneous)
Reference29 articles.
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5. J. Forder: On the measurement and assessment of ‘institutional’ remedies, in: Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 48, 1996, pp. 39–51.
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