Compensation for Historic Injustice: Does it Matter how the Victims Respond?

Abstract

AbstractWhen states are required to compensate victim groups for the historic wrongs they have committed, how should the compensation due be calculated? It seems that alongside the counterfactual world in which the wrongdoing never occurred, we should also consider the counterfactual world in which the wrongdoing has occurred, but the victims have responded to it in a prudent way. Under tort law, the damages a victim can claim are reduced if they are judged to have been contributorily negligent, thereby exacerbating the harm they have suffered. The paper considers four reasons why victim groups could not be expected to respond collectively to injustice in a way that outsiders might judge to be prudent. 1. The wrongdoing has destroyed their capacity to act as a group agent. 2. The wrongdoing has inflicted psychological traumas that lead them to make poor decisions. 3. They would need to violate a moral norm that is deeply embedded in their culture. 4. They would need to adopt policies that risk inflicting severe injustice on an internal minority. In many instances of historic injustice, one or more of these reasons apply. So although in principle victims’ behaviour is relevant when compensation is being calculated, we must be very cautious in using that doctrine to assess real cases.