Formal analysis of an AUTOSAR-based basic software module

Abstract

AbstractThe widespread use of advanced driver assistance systems in modern vehicles, together with their integration with the Internet and other road nodes, has made vehicle more vulnerable to cyber-attacks. To address these risks, the automotive industry is increasingly focusing on the development of security solutions: formal methods and software verification techniques, which have been successfully applied to a number of safety-critical systems, could be a promising approach in the automotive area. In this work, we concentrate on in-vehicle communications, provided by many Electronic Control Units (ECUs) that work together thanks to serial protocols such as Controller Area Network (CAN). However, increasing connectivity exposes the internal network to a variety of cyber-risks. Our aim is to formally verify the AUTOSAR-based Basic Software module called CINNAMON, designed to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and authentication at the same time for traffic exchanged over CAN protocol. More precisely, it adds confidentiality guarantees to the Secure Onboard Communication (SecOC) module. We formally analyze CINNAMON with the verification tool Tamarin. Our analysis shows that CINNAMON could be an effective security solution, as it can ensure the desired properties, in particular, confidentiality in a send-receive scenario between two ECUs. Finally, we describe a potential application scenario.