Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Reference25 articles.
1. Anshelevich, E., Dasgupta, A., Kleinberg, L., Tardos, E., Wexler, T., & Roughgarden, T. (2004). The price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation. In 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pp. 59–73.
2. Archer, A., & Kleinberg, R. (2014). Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness. Games and Economic Behavior, 86, 340–366.
3. Carroll, G. (2012). When are local incentive constraints sufficient? Econometrica, 80(2), 661–686.
4. Chen, H. L., Roughgarden, T., & Valiant, G. (2008). Designing networks with good equilibria. Proceedings of the 19th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms.
5. Epstein, A., Feldman, M., & Mansour, Y. (2007). Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games. San Diego: ACM conference on Electronic Commerce.