Abstract
AbstractI criticize the current usage of the terms “enhancement” and “disenhancement” in the debate over the genetic modification of animals and propose an alternative definition of these terms based on how modifications affect animals’ welfare in particular contexts. The critique largely follows a similar criticism of the use of the term “enhancements” in the human bioethics literature. I first describe how the term “disenhancement” has been used in debates thus far, and argue that the present lack of a shared definition is problematic. I then consider some potential definitions of “disenhancement” that can be adapted from the human bioethics literature and argue that most of these uses are flawed for the purposes of using the term in current ethical debates. Finally, I elaborate on the welfarist conception of disenhancement and consider some potential objections, using examples from the literature to illustrate key points.
Publisher
Springer International Publishing
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