Responsibility in Science: The Philosophical View

Abstract

AbstractTerms of responsibility are relational attributes, i.e., attribution terms. They are to be understood as linguistically, socially, and situationally embedded concepts conventionalized by rules and have to be analyzed accordingly. A structural theory of responsibility, and more differentiated forms and types of responsibility such as relational attribution-based concepts, will be developed schematically in order to do justice to the variety of different uses of the concepts of responsibility, e.g., causal and action responsibility, role responsibility, but also social and (universal) moral and legal responsibility. In this chapter, I apply the general considerations of responsibility to analyze responsibility in science. The responsibility of the researcher in science and technology is a special case of role-specific and moral responsibility in a strategic position. Points to be discussed include known means of implementing responsibility in science, including codes of conduct, ethics committees, a scientific ethos, and the Hippocratic Oath for scientists. The chapter concludes with fifteen theses on responsibility in science. The key principle should be “concrete humanity”: Practical and concrete humanity should always be a central guiding principle (in dubio pro humanitate practica).