Getting the Short End of the Stick: Power Relations and Their Distributive Outcomes for Lower-Income Countries in Transfer Pricing Governance

Abstract

AbstractIt is widely recognized that international corporate taxation holds a distributional bias toward advanced economies and that developing countries only play a marginal role in tax governance-making. Yet, it is the ambition of both the G20 and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to integrate developing countries in the BEPS Inclusive Framework. The Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) action is the latest global initiative to update the international framework of corporate taxation and curb corporate tax avoidance. On one hand, the integration for developing countries within the policy-making forums remains incomplete and focused on the implementation of the global tax rules. On the other, even when lower-income countries have a seat at the table, uneven power relations shape the distributional outcomes of the G20-OECD tax reform project. This analysis of the power relations at play during the revision of the transactional profit split method (TPSM) reveals how dominant logics on value creation work against the material interests of developing countries in the distribution of taxing rights. Therefore, for a tax reform to be truly legitimate for developing countries, it should emancipate and even “decolonize” the discourse and ideas of the international tax regime. While the updated OECD guidelines on transfer pricing expanded the size of the overall cake of taxable profits, the dominant logics and criteria of the guidance make it difficult for lower-income countries to obtain a decent slice of the cake and actually eat it.