Getting Chip Card Payments Right-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Getting Chip Card Payments Right

Published:2024-09-11 Issue: Volume: Page:29-51
ISSN:0302-9743
Container-title:Lecture Notes in Computer Science
language:en
Short-container-title:

Author:

Basin David^ORCID,Hofmeier Xenia^ORCID,Sasse Ralf^ORCID,Toro-Pozo Jorge

Abstract

AbstractEMV is the international protocol standard for smart card payments and is used in billions of payment cards worldwide. Despite the standard’s advertised security, various issues have been previously uncovered, deriving from logical flaws that are hard to spot in EMV’s lengthy and complex specification. We have formalized various models of EMV in Tamarin, a symbolic model checker for cryptographic protocols. Tamarin was extremely effective in finding critical flaws, both known and new, and in many cases exploitable on actual cards. We report on these past problems as well as followup work where we verified the latest, improved version of the protocol, the EMV kernel C8. This work puts C8’s correctness on a firm, formal basis, and clarifies which guarantees hold for C8 and under which assumptions. Overall our work supports the thesis that cryptographic protocol model checkers like Tamarin have an essential role to play in improving the security of real-world payment protocols and that they are up to this challenge.

Publisher

Springer Nature Switzerland

Link

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-031-71162-6_2

Reference18 articles.

1. Tamarin Version 1.9.0, Git Revision: 57e619fef32033293e4a83c0be67cc6e296bf166, branch: develop

2. Apple Inc.: Tap to Pay on iPhone. https://developer.apple.com/tap-to-pay/

3. Basin, D., Cremers, C., Jannik, D., Sasse, R.: Modeling and analyzing security protocols with Tamarin: a comprehensive guide. In: Information Security and Cryptography. Springer (2024). To appear

4. Basin, D., Hofmeier, X., Sasse, R., Toro-Pozo, J.: Tamarin models of C8. https://github.com/tamarin-prover/tamarin-prover/tree/develop/examples/fm24-cardpayments

5. Basin, D., Sasse, R., Toro-Pozo, J.: Card brand mixup attack: bypassing the PIN in non-visa cards by using them for visa transactions. In: 30th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 21), pp. 179–194. USENIX Association (2021)