From Relay Attacks to Distance-Bounding Protocols-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

From Relay Attacks to Distance-Bounding Protocols

Published:2021 Issue: Volume: Page:113-130
ISSN:
Container-title:Security of Ubiquitous Computing Systems
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Author:

Avoine Gildas,Boureanu Ioana,Gérault David,Hancke Gerhard P.,Lafourcade Pascal,Onete Cristina

Abstract

AbstractWe present the concept of relay attacks, and discuss distance-bounding schemes as the main countermeasure. We give details on relaying mechanisms, we review canonical distance-bounding protocols, as well as their threat-model (i.e., covering attacks beyond relaying) stemming from the authentication dimension in distance bounding. Advanced aspects of distance-bounding security are also covered. We conclude by presenting what we consider to be the most important challenges in distance bounding.

Publisher

Springer International Publishing

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-030-10591-4_7

Reference52 articles.

1. Gildas Avoine, Muhammed Ali Bingöl, Ioana Boureanu, Srdjan čapkun, Gerhard Hancke, Süleyman Kardaş, Chong Hee Kim, Cédric Lauradoux, Benjamin Martin, Jorge Munilla, Alberto Peinado, Kasper Bonne Rasmussen, Dave Singelée, Aslan Tchamkerten, Rolando Trujillo-Rasua, and Serge Vaudenay. Security of distance-bounding: A survey. ACM Comput. Surv., 51(5):94:1–94:33, September 2018.

2. Gildas Avoine, Muhammed Ali Bingöl, Süleyman Kardaş, Cédric Lauradoux, and Benjamin Martin. A formal framework for analyzing RFID distance bounding protocols. In Journal of Computer Security - Special Issue on RFID System Security, 2010, volume 19, pages 289–317, 2011.

3. Gildas Avoine, Xavier Bultel, Sébastien Gambs, David Gérault, Pascal Lafourcade, Cristina Onete, and Jean-Marc Robert. A terrorist-fraud resistant and extractor-free anonymous distance-bounding protocol. In ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security, ASIA CCS ’17, pages 800–814, New York, NY, USA, 2017. ACM.

4. Gildas Avoine and Aslan Tchamkerten. An efficient distance bounding RFID authentication protocol: Balancing false-acceptance rate and memory requirement. In International Conference on Information Security (ISC) 2009, volume 5735 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 250–261. Springer, 2009.

5. Aslı Bay, Ioana Boureanu, Aikaterini Mitrokotsa, Iosif Spulber, and Serge Vaudenay. The bussard-bagga and other distance-bounding protocols under attacks. In Mirosław Kutyłowski and Moti Yung, editors, Information Security and Cryptology, pages 371–391. Springer, 2013.

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