The Moral Dimension of Countermovements: The Case of Anti-Feminism

Abstract

AbstractThe aim of the chapter is to develop an analytical framework for studying the moral dimension of countermovements, which despite obvious significance for movement mobilization is rarely considered in countermovement theory. We argue that Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition can be used to develop an analytical framework that allows for grasping not only the moral dimension of struggles between social movements and countermovements but also moral divisions within countermovements. According to Honneth, social struggles stem from perceived misrecognition in relation to a set of moral meta-values that form the basis of legitimate claims in Western society: love, equality, and achievement. These meta-values can be understood differently in concrete areas of political struggle, and activists from different camps tend to make quite different interpretations. With this approach, it is possible to analyze countermovements’ moral claims in relation to social movements’ societal values and norms, and whether and how different strands within a countermovement make different types of moral claims.We demonstrate the usefulness of the analytical framework by applying it to the division between feminism and anti-feminism and the division between varieties of anti-feminism (the Christian Right movement, the mythopoetic men’s movement, the men’s rights movement, and the manosphere). What emerges is a picture of the interrelationship between feminism and anti-feminism that is more complex than the common designation of progressive versus reactionary movements. It is clear that the different strands of anti-feminism relate morally in partly different ways to feminism. They all react against what is understood as misrecognition of men as a result of feminism, but the types of moral claims and their specific emphasis on them vary.