Are Exploration-Based Strategies of Interest for Repeated Stochastic Coalitional Games?-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Are Exploration-Based Strategies of Interest for Repeated Stochastic Coalitional Games?

Published:2021 Issue: Volume: Page:89-100
ISSN:0302-9743
Container-title:Lecture Notes in Computer Science
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Author:

Guéneron Josselin,Bonnet Grégory

Publisher

Springer International Publishing

Link

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-030-85739-4_8

Reference16 articles.

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3. Chalkiadakis, G., Boutilier, C.: Sequential decision making in repeated coalition formation under uncertainty. In: Proceedings of 7th AAMAS, pp. 347–354 (2008)

4. Chalkiadakis, G., Elkind, E., Wooldridge, M.: Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory. Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning, vol. 5, no. 6, pp. 1–168 (2011)

5. Charnes, A., Granot, D.: Prior solutions: extensions of convex nucleus solutions to chance-constrained games. Texas University, Austin Center for Cybernetic Studies, no. CS-118 (1973)

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