Author:
Johansson Lars-Göran,Banitz Thomas,Grimm Volker,Hertz Tilman,Lindkvist Emilie,Martínez Peña Rodrigo,Radosavljevic Sonja,Ylikoski Petri,Schlüter Maja
Abstract
AbstractWhen talking about causes we often think of an imagined contrast to the real sequence of events: we use a counterfactual, asking what would have happened if the cause had not occurred. But one might be doubtful about the explanatory force of this analysis. The basic problem is that the truth or falsity of a counterfactual statement cannot be determined by empirical means. In some cases, notably in physics, we can apply a strict law when justifying claims about alternative scenarios. In most cases, however, we have at best regularities and in such cases it is difficult to have any confidence in the corresponding counterfactual. An account of causation in terms of the more restricted concept of potential outcomes is much more useful. It is closer to empirical practice and is more reliable. The main points are:
It is common to explain the meaning of A caused B’ as ‘If A had not occurred, then B would not have occurred.’
This is no step forward, since we do not in general know whether the counterfactual is true.
Rubin’s more restricted notion of potential outcome is to be preferred, since it can be applied to empirical research.
Publisher
Springer Nature Switzerland