A New Lower Bound for Deterministic Truthful Scheduling-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

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A New Lower Bound for Deterministic Truthful Scheduling

Published:2020 Issue: Volume: Page:226-240
ISSN:0302-9743
Container-title:Algorithmic Game Theory
language:
Short-container-title:

Author:

Giannakopoulos Yiannis^ORCID,Hammerl Alexander,Poças Diogo^ORCID

Publisher

Springer International Publishing

Link

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-030-57980-7_15

Reference35 articles.

1. Ashlagi, I., Dobzinski, S., Lavi, R.: Optimal lower bounds for anonymous scheduling mechanisms. Math. Oper. Res. 37(2), 244–258 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1110.0534

2. Auletta, V., De Prisco, R., Penna, P., Persiano, G.: The power of verification for one-parameter agents. J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 75(3), 190–211 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcss.2008.10.001

3. Archer, A., Tardos, É.: Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents. In: Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pp. 482–491 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1109/sfcs.2001.959924

4. Chen, X., Du, D., Zuluaga, L.F.: Copula-based randomized mechanisms for truthful scheduling on two unrelated machines. Theory Comput. Syst. 57(3), 753–781 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-014-9601-5

5. Chawla, S., Hartline, J.D., Malec, D., Sivan, B.: Prior-independent mechanisms for scheduling. In: Proceedings of the 45th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pp. 51–60 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1145/2488608.2488616

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