1. For recent approaches to the development of German Idealism that stress the Idealists’ responses to Kant’s claim that philosophy must be “systematic” or “scientific,” see Paul W. Franks, All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005);
2. Eckart Förster, The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy: A Systematic Reconstruction (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012);
3. and Walter Jaeschke and Andreas Arndt, Die Klassische Deutsche Philosophie nach Kant: Systeme der reinen Vernunft und ihre Kritik 1785–1846 (Munich: Beck, 2012). For an approach focusing on the Idealists’ “struggle against subjectivism,” or their attempt to overcome Berkeleyan tendencies in Kant, see
4. Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism 1781–1801 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), although, as the dates cited in this title make clear, this work deals with Fichte and Schelling but not Hegel.
5. The “methodological” or “epistemological” interpretation of transcendental idealism has been maintained by Henry E. Allison in Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), and further defended in the second edition (2004); but was anticipated by