Author:
Nitzan Asaf D. M.,Nitzan Shmuel I.
Abstract
AbstractThis paper evaluates three prominent voting systems: the Majority Rule (MR), Borda Rule (BR), and Plurality Rule (PR). Our analysis centers on the susceptibilities of each system to potential transgressions of two foundational principles: the respect for majority preference (majoritarianism) and the acknowledgment of the intensity of individual preferences. We operationalize the concept of 'cost' as the expected deviation from the aforementioned principles. A comparative assessment of MR, BR, and PR is undertaken in terms of their costs. Our findings underscore the superiority of PR over MR, whilst also highlighting the comparative advantage of MR against BR.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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