Firm performance, imperfect competition, and corruption risks in procurement: evidence from Swedish municipalities

Author:

Wittberg EmanuelORCID,Fazekas MihályORCID

Abstract

AbstractPrevious research has shown that corruption risks may distort market incentives in high-risk contexts. However, there is a dearth of evidence on the potential impact of corruption in settings characterized by low corruption and high-quality institutions. Against that background, this paper delves deeper into the alleged consequences of corruption by examining the link between corruption risks in public procurement and the profitability of firms in the Swedish construction industry. We introduce a novel measure of corruption risk based on the share of single bidder contracts that a firm has won. Validity analysis confirms that our measure is correlated with an alternative corruption measure and local tender winners. Our results reveal that firms that win many single bidder contracts have higher profitability than other firms in the sector: 10 percentage points higher single bidding rate firms have a 0.2–0.6-percentage-point higher sales margin. The findings underscore that public procurement corruption risks distort markets and economic incentives, and that this risk is present even in low-corruption contexts such as in Sweden.

Funder

Centre for Local Government Studies

Konkurrensverket

Linköping University

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Economics and Econometrics,Sociology and Political Science

Reference58 articles.

1. Acar, W., & Sankaran, K. (1999). The myth of the unique decomposability: Specializing the Herfindahl and entropy measures? Strategic Management Journal, 20(10), 969–975.

2. Arellano, M., & Bover, O. (1995). Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components models. Journal of Econometrics, 68(1), 29–51.

3. Barnett, W. P., & McKendrick, D. G. (2004). Why are some organizations more competitive than others? Evidence from a changing global market. Administrative Science Quarterly, 49(4), 535–571.

4. Bauhr, M. (2012). Need or greed corruption? In S. Holmberg & B. Rothstein (Eds.), Good Government The relevance of political science (pp. 68–86). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

5. Bergh, A., Erlingsson, G. Ó., & Wittberg, E. (2021). What happens when municipalities run corporations? Empirical evidence from 290 Swedish municipalities. Local Government Studies, 48(4), 1–24.

Cited by 1 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献 订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

1. Discretion and public procurement outcomes in Europe*;European Journal of Political Economy;2024-03

同舟云学术

1.学者识别学者识别

2.学术分析学术分析

3.人才评估人才评估

"同舟云学术"是以全球学者为主线,采集、加工和组织学术论文而形成的新型学术文献查询和分析系统,可以对全球学者进行文献检索和人才价值评估。用户可以通过关注某些学科领域的顶尖人物而持续追踪该领域的学科进展和研究前沿。经过近期的数据扩容,当前同舟云学术共收录了国内外主流学术期刊6万余种,收集的期刊论文及会议论文总量共计约1.5亿篇,并以每天添加12000余篇中外论文的速度递增。我们也可以为用户提供个性化、定制化的学者数据。欢迎来电咨询!咨询电话:010-8811{复制后删除}0370

www.globalauthorid.com

TOP

Copyright © 2019-2024 北京同舟云网络信息技术有限公司
京公网安备11010802033243号  京ICP备18003416号-3