Abstract
AbstractWe use experimental data to explore the conditions under which males and females may differ in their tendency to act corruptly and their tolerance of corruption. We ask if males and females respond differently to the tradeoff between the benefits accrued by corrupt actors versus the negative externality imposed on other people by corruption. Our findings reveal that neither males nor females uniformly are more likely to engage in, or be more tolerant of corruption: it depends on the exact bribery conditions—which can reduce or enhance welfare overall—and the part played in the bribery act. Females are less likely to tolerate and engage in corruption when doing so reduces overall welfare. On the other hand, males are less tolerant of bribery when it enhances welfare but confers payoff disadvantages on them relative to corrupt actors. Females’ behavior is consistent across roles when bribery reduces welfare, but apart from that, gender behavior is strongly role-dependent.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Economics and Econometrics,Sociology and Political Science
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