Does Kripke’s Argument Against Functionalism Undermine the Standard View of What Computers Are?-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Does Kripke’s Argument Against Functionalism Undermine the Standard View of What Computers Are?

Published:2018-06-12 Issue:3 Volume:28 Page:491-513
ISSN:0924-6495
Container-title:Minds and Machines
language:en
Short-container-title:Minds & Machines

Author:

Buechner Jeff

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Artificial Intelligence,Philosophy

Link

http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11023-018-9466-5/fulltext.html

Reference20 articles.

1. Aho, A., Hopcroft, J., & Ullman, J. (1982). Data structures and algorithms. Boston: Addison-Wesley.

2. Buechner, J. (2008). Gödel, Putnam, and functionalism. Cambridge: MIT Press.

3. Buechner, J. (2011). Not even computing machines can follow rules: Kripke’s critique of functionalism. In A. Berger (Ed.), Saul Kripke. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

4. Davis, P., & Cerutti, E. (1969). Formac meets Pappus: Some observations on elementary analytic geometry by computer. American Mathematical Monthly, 76, 895–905.

5. Dean, W. (2007). What algorithms could not be. Ph.D. dissertation. Rutgers University.

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