Abstract
AbstractMany community-rated health insurance markets include risk equalization (also known as risk adjustment) to mitigate risk selection incentives for competing insurers. Empirical evaluations of risk equalization typically quantify selection incentives through predictable profits and losses net of risk equalization for various groups of consumers (e.g. the healthy versus the chronically ill). The underlying assumption is that absence of predictable profits and losses implies absence of selection incentives. This paper questions this assumption. We show that even when risk equalization perfectly compensates insurers for predictable differences in mean spending between groups, selection incentives are likely to remain. The reason is that the uncertainty about residual spending (i.e., spending net of risk equalization) differs across groups, e.g., the risk of substantial losses is larger for the chronically ill than for the healthy. In a risk-rated market, insurers are likely to charge a higher profit mark-up (to cover uncertainty in residual spending) and a higher safety mark-up (to cover the risk of large losses) to chronically ill than to healthy individuals. When such differentiation is not allowed, insurers face incentives to select in favor of the healthy. Although the exact size of these selection incentives depends on contextual factors, our empirical simulations indicate they can be non-trivial. Our findings suggest that – in addition to the equalization of differences in mean spending between the healthy and the chronically ill – policy measures might be needed to diminish (or compensate insurers for) heteroscedasticity of residual spending across groups.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Health Policy,Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
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