Author:
Borm Peter,Funaki Yukihiko,Ju Yuan
Abstract
AbstractThis paper introduces a model to analyze individual externalities and the associated negotiation problem, which has been largely neglected in the game theoretic literature. Following an axiomatic perspective, we propose a solution, as a payoff sharing scheme, called the balanced threat agreement, for such problems. It highlights an agent’s potential influences on all agents by threatening to enter or quit. We further study the solution by investigating its consistency. We also offer a discussion on the related stability issue.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering,Environmental Engineering
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