Scientific Realism, Metaphysical Antirealism and the No Miracle Arguments

Author:

Alai MarioORCID

Abstract

AbstractMany formulations of scientific realism (SR) include some commitment to metaphysical realism (MR). On the other hand, authors like Schlick, Carnap and Putnam held forms of scientific realism coupled with metaphysical antirealism (and this has analogies in Kant). So we might ask: do scientific realists really need MR? or is MR already implied by SR, so that SR is actually incompatible with metaphysical antirealism? And if MR must really be added to SR, why is that so? And which additional arguments scientific realists need to support it? After reviewing and classifying a number of different kinds of realisms, metaphysical and not, I answer that SR and MR are logically independent of each other, so that there is no logical inconsistency in holding SR while rejecting MR. However, I argue that the “no miracle” argument (NMA) not only is the “ultimate” argument for SR, but by the same token it also supports MR. Therefore one cannot effectively defend SR without also subscribing to MR, but this can be done at no additional argumentative cost. I show this by discussing not only the standard version of the NMA, but also three more versions which are not usually considered as such in the literature.

Funder

Contributo d’Ateneo progetti PRIN2015 of the University of Urbino

PRIN2017 MIUR Italian Ministry of Education University and Research

University of Urbino Carlo Bo

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

History and Philosophy of Science,Multidisciplinary

Reference49 articles.

1. Agazzi, E. (2014). Scientific objectivity and its contexts. Cham: Springer.

2. Alai, M. (1991). Goodman's paradox: Drawing conclusions from a long debate. In Nuovi problemi della logica e della filosofia della scienza, Atti del Congresso S.I.L.F.S. 1990, vol. I, a cura di D. Costantini e M.C. Galavotti, CLUEB, Bologna (pp. 109‒116).

3. Alai, M. (1994). Modi di conoscere il mondo. Milano: Franco Angeli.

4. Alai, M. (2014a). Novel predictions and the no miracle argument. Erkenntnis,79(2), 297–326.

5. Alai, M. (2014b). Explanatory realism. In E. Agazzi (Ed.), Science, metaphysics, religion. Proceedings of the conference of the international academy of philosophy of science, Siroki Brijeg 24‒24 July 2013. Milano: Franco Angeli (pp. 99‒116).

Cited by 6 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献 订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

1. How (not) to integrate scientific and moral realism;Synthese;2024-02-03

2. Short on Peirce as a Scientific Philosopher;Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy;2023-09

3. The Use of Philosophy of Science in the Creationism-Evolution Debate: An Ashʿarī Perspective;Theology and Science;2023-07-03

4. Some reflections on Mitchell’s pragmatist variant of scientific realism;THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science;2023-06-27

5. Scientific realism and antirealism in geography;PHILOS INQ;2023

同舟云学术

1.学者识别学者识别

2.学术分析学术分析

3.人才评估人才评估

"同舟云学术"是以全球学者为主线,采集、加工和组织学术论文而形成的新型学术文献查询和分析系统,可以对全球学者进行文献检索和人才价值评估。用户可以通过关注某些学科领域的顶尖人物而持续追踪该领域的学科进展和研究前沿。经过近期的数据扩容,当前同舟云学术共收录了国内外主流学术期刊6万余种,收集的期刊论文及会议论文总量共计约1.5亿篇,并以每天添加12000余篇中外论文的速度递增。我们也可以为用户提供个性化、定制化的学者数据。欢迎来电咨询!咨询电话:010-8811{复制后删除}0370

www.globalauthorid.com

TOP

Copyright © 2019-2024 北京同舟云网络信息技术有限公司
京公网安备11010802033243号  京ICP备18003416号-3