Abstract
AbstractThe aim of this contribution is to provide a rather general answer to Hume’s problem. To this end, induction is treated within a straightforward formal paradigm, i.e., several connected levels of abstraction. Within this setting, many concrete models are discussed. On the one hand, models from mathematics, statistics and information science demonstrate how induction might succeed. On the other hand, standard examples from philosophy highlight fundamental difficulties. Thus it transpires that the difference between unbounded and bounded inductive steps is crucial: while unbounded leaps of faith are never justified, there may well be reasonable bounded inductive steps. In this endeavour, the twin concepts of information and probability prove to be indispensable, pinning down the crucial arguments, and, at times, reducing them to calculations. Essentially, a precise study of boundedness settles Goodman’s challenge. Hume’s more profound claim of seemingly inevitable circularity is answered by obviously non-circular hierarchical structures.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
History and Philosophy of Science,Multidisciplinary
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