Do elected public utility commissioners behave more politically than appointed ones?-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Do elected public utility commissioners behave more politically than appointed ones?

Published:2007-11-10 Issue:3 Volume:33 Page:318-337
ISSN:0922-680X
Container-title:Journal of Regulatory Economics
language:en
Short-container-title:J Regul Econ

Author:

Quast Troy

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Economics and Econometrics

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11149-007-9050-z.pdf

Reference17 articles.

1. Baron D. (1988). Regulation and Legislative Choice. Rand Journal of Economics 20, 467–477

2. Beard, T. R., & Ford, G. (2004). Splitting the Baby: An empirical test of rules of thumb in regulatory price setting. Unpublished manuscript. http://www.aestudies.com/library/uneprice.pdf . Accessed 30 March 2005.

3. Besley T., Coate S. (2003). Elected versus appointed regulators: Theory and evidence. Journal of the European Economic Association 1, 1176–1206

4. Boyes W., McDowell J. (1989). The selection of public utility commissioners: A reexamination of the importance of institutional setting. Public Choice 61, 1–13

5. Costello K. (1984). Electing regulators: The case of public utility commissioners. Yale Journal on Regulation 2, 83–105

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