On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency

Published:2017-12-04 Issue:1 Volume:84 Page:83-97
ISSN:0040-5833
Container-title:Theory and Decision
language:en
Short-container-title:Theory Decis

Author:

Bergantiños Gustavo,Massó Jordi^ORCID,Neme Alejandro

Funder

Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad

Secretaría de Estado de Investigación, Desarrollo e Innovación

Departament d’Universitats, Recerca i Societat de la Informació

Fundación Séneca

Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte

CONICET

Universidad Nacional de San Luis

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Computer Science Applications,General Economics, Econometrics and Finance,General Social Sciences,Applied Psychology,Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous),Developmental and Educational Psychology,General Decision Sciences

Link

http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11238-017-9644-6/fulltext.html

Reference16 articles.

1. Barberà, S., Maschler, M., & Shalev, J. (2001). Voting for voters: a model of electoral evolution. Games and Economic Behavior, 37, 40–78.

2. Barberà, S., & Perea, A. (2002). Supporting others and the evolution of influence. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 26, 2051–2092.

3. Berga, D., Bergantiños, G., Massó, J., & Neme, A. (2004). Stability and voting by committees with exit. Social Choice and Welfare, 23, 229–247.

4. Berga, D., Bergantiños, G., Massó, J., & Neme, A. (2006). On exiting after voting. International Journal of Game Theory, 34, 33–54.

5. Berga, D., Bergantiños, G., Massó, J., & Neme, A. (2007). An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit. Mathematical Social Sciences, 54, 152–175.

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