Abstract
AbstractWe consider the problem of a society that uses a voting rule to choose a subset from a given set of objects (candidates, binary issues, or alike). We assume that voters’ preferences over subsets of objects are separable: adding an object to a set leads to a better set if and only if the object is good (as a singleton set, the object is better than the empty set). A voting rule is strategy-proof if no voter benefits by not revealing its preferences truthfully and it is false-name-proof if no voter benefits by submitting several votes under other identities. We characterize all voting rules that satisfy false-name-proofness, strategy-proofness, and ontoness as the class of voting rules in which an object is chosen if it has either at least one vote in every society or a unanimous vote in every society. To do this, we first prove that if a voting rule is false-name-proof, strategy-proof, and onto, then the identities of the voters are not important.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Computer Science Applications,General Economics, Econometrics and Finance,General Social Sciences,Applied Psychology,Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous),Developmental and Educational Psychology,General Decision Sciences
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